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I. INTRODUCTION
The water explodes, boiling and bubbling, as a great behemoth shatters its
calm surface. The giant tarpon roars from the abyss, shaking its head in
defiance at the audacity of a red-faced, adrenaline-ridden fisherman. The
leviathan’s powerful tail skates across the top of the water, its body thrashing
wildly before crashing back into what had just moments before been a
beautifully translucent, emerald ocean.
Who would dare hook an
intimidating giant such as this? After a few more head shaking jumps,
furious runs, and deep dives, the long battle ends with a cold stare from
prehistoric, unblinking eyes. The hook is pulled out, and the mighty game
fish swims off into the sea, warier of the next meal that floats by its open
maw.
Tarpon are prized game fish.1 A “game fish” is a fish that anglers pursue
primarily for the sporting thrill of the catch.2 The awe-inspiring acrobatics
and sheer ferocity with which tarpon battle those wily enough to entice a bite
from the fish’s powerful jaws intoxicates anglers across the globe.3 The
excitement generated from managing to hook these powerful fish tempts
many an angler to spend all of his or her spare time carefully constructing
different machinations that may outsmart these beautiful creatures.4
Tarpon also migrate.5 The fish travel throughout the warm waters of the
Caribbean off the coasts of Central America and the southeastern United
States.6 Therein lies the problem affecting the long-term viability of the
species. Actions that destroy juvenile tarpon habitat or kill adult tarpon in
one portion of the fish’s range will ripple throughout the entirety of states
1 Tarpon, INTERNATIONAL GAME FISH ASSOCIATION, https://igfa.org/species/238-tarpon.
aspx?CommonName=238-tarpon.aspx (describing tarpon as “one of the first saltwater species
to be declared a game fish”).
2 Jerry Gibbs, Tarpon: The Greatest Game Fish, OUTDOOR LIFE, Sept. 2007, http://www.
outdoorlife.com/articles/fishing/2007/09/tarpon-greatest-game-fish (comparing the thrill of
catching a tarpon to riding a roller coaster, since the first thought in each situation is, “My
God, what have I done?”).
3 Id. (listing the Florida Keys, Louisiana, and Costa Rica as locations where anglers fish
for tarpon).
4
See My Tarpon Addiction, FIELD AND STREAM, May 2005, http://www.fieldandstream.com/
articles/fishing/saltwater/2005/05/my-tarpon-addiction (discussing one angler’s determination to
find and catch tarpon as a generalization of tarpon fishing).
5 A. Adams et al., Megalops atlanticus, in THE IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED SPECIES
(Int’l Union for Conservation of Nature & Natural Res., ed., 2012), http://www.iucnredlist.
org/details/191823/0.
6 Id.
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along the migration pattern.7 Traditional attempts to address this problem
have largely been unsuccessful.8 Further, the lack of rebound in tarpon
populations suggests current efforts have not provided adequate protection
for the species.9 On the other hand, international agreements addressing
transboundary waters seem to have proven successful in addressing problems
concerning the maintenance of adequate flows for international rivers.10
Since tarpon migrations are similar to the flow of an international river, the
same framework could potentially be implemented to sustainably manage
tarpon population.
This Note suggests a regime capable of adequately protecting tarpon.
That system will be formed by comparing traditional water rights regimes
like those governing transboundary flows of water with the movement of
migratory fish populations such as tarpon. This analogy encourages the
creation of duties that would require upstream states in a migratory pattern to
sustainably manage migratory fish populations; thereby avoiding harm to
downstream states, and providing for the future of the migratory population.
In other words, just as upstream states owe a duty to preserve certain levels
of water to flow to downstream states, a similar duty may be imposed to
preserve flows of a different kind of natural resource—namely, the migratory
fish that populate those states’ shared waters. Ultimately, this Note seeks to
determine whether a duty to conserve migratory fish populations, or at least
to manage said populations sustainably, may be imposed in international
riparian rights systems.
Part II of this Note begins by outlining the unique biology of tarpon that
both inspires their protection and compromises the long-term health of the
species. Part III frames the problem that regulating tarpon poses by outlining
7

See Kirk Deeter, Tarpon Tagging Key to Understanding Silver Kings, FIELD AND
STREAM, Sept. 2015, http://www.fieldandstream.com/blogs/flytalk/tarpon-tagging-key-to-und
erstanding-silver-kings (explaining that when an individual spears a tarpon in one area, he or
she is “really impacting fisheries many miles away”).
8 David Sikes, Catch Me If You Can, TEXAS PARKS & WILDLIFE MAGAZINE, June 2011,
http://www.tpwmagazine.com/archive/2011/jun/ed_2/index.phtml (contrasting current efforts
to increase the tarpon population with post conservation effects on tarpon populations).
9 Id. (noting a general decline in tarpon populations off of the coast of Texas and
discussing calls for “a uniform regulation plan and development of an international
management strategy” that goes beyond previous conservation efforts).
10 Transboundary Waters, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/transbo
undary_waters.shtml. See, e.g., Trans-Boundary Agreements, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, http://12.000.scripts.mit.edu/mission2017trans-boundary-agreements/ (describing
the successful allocation of water from the Orange River between Lesotho and South Africa’s
international agreement).
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classic remedies to these general problems, describing the current state of
affairs, and explaining why current efforts are not providing adequate
protection for the overall health of the tarpon population. Part IV of this
Note attempts to re-focus the legal problem by analyzing mechanisms that
already exist in similar contexts where problems regulating a resource span
international boundaries—international water use agreements. Part IV then
argues for the creation of a system that effectively manages migratory fish
populations in the same manner that existing international riparian rights are
preserved. In essence, through analogizing international flows of one
profoundly important resource—water—with flows of another resource—
tarpon—this Note argues that upstream states in migration patterns should
owe duties to preserve certain rates of flow of migratory fish to downstream
states.
II. MEET THE SILVER KING
Tarpon are colloquially described as the “Silver King,” which refers to the
tarpon’s silvery color and impressive size.11 To describe tarpon as merely an
impressive fish is an exercise in understatement.12 These fish can approach,
sometimes even exceed, eight feet in length, and have been measured
upwards of two hundred and eighty pounds in weight.13 Tarpon are also a
highly migratory fish species.14 These fish can normally be found moving
throughout the Gulf of Mexico between Central America and the United
States.15 As a species, however, tarpon are distributed along the eastern
coast of the United States, throughout the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, and
down the eastern coast of Central and South America.16 Usually these fish

11 Tarpon Facts, FLORIDA FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, http://myfwc.
com/research/saltwater/tarpon/information/facts/; Tarpon: Silver King of the Coast, SEA
STATS (Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, St. Petersburg, Fla.), Dec. 2011, at 1,
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/3459 5046/Sea-Stats-Tarpon?in_collection=2498616.
12 Tarpon Facts, supra note 11 (noting that because of its strength, stamina, and fighting
ability, many revere the tarpon as one of Florida’s premier game fish). See, e.g., Tarpon Tale,
FLORIDA FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, http://myfwc.com/research/salt
water/tarpon/information/tarpon-tale/ (telling a story of catching a tarpon that, once hooked,
jumped across the bow of a boat, clearing it by as much as three feet, while being chased by a
nine-foot bull shark).
13 Tarpon: Silver King of the Coast, supra note 11, at 1.
14 Adams et al., supra note 5.
15 Id.
16 Id.
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roam no more than about one hundred and fifty five miles from shore.17 As
they travel through the Gulf of Mexico, no recorded tarpon has taken a direct
path from Mexico to Florida; instead the fish typically travel through the
waters of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas before making their
way into Central America—reinforcing the belief that tarpon prefer the
warmer waters closer to shore.18
Tarpon do not spend their entire lives in these warm, near-shore waters.
Tarpon spawn offshore.19 Upon fertilization, the larval stage tarpon, called a
leptocaphalus, swims into an estuary.20 Estuaries are bodies of water where
fresh water mixes with and dilutes salt water, often the point where a river
meets the sea.21 After a month, the leptocaphalus develops into a juvenile,
and continues its journey to adulthood in the mosquito-infested, back-bay
creeks of protected mangrove estuaries and wetlands.22 These estuarine
environments typically have low dissolved oxygen content, which helps
protect juvenile tarpon from predators.23 Juvenile tarpon are able to survive
in these low oxygen content waters because of their unique ability to obtain
air from the surface rather than the water.24
Tarpon also have a long life span,25 which adds to the allure of attempting
to catch these magnificent creatures. Because these fish live to such old
ages, they seem at times to evade the efforts of all except the craftiest angler.
While tarpon can live as long as thirty years, tarpon mature relatively slowly,
reaching sexual maturity around ten years of age.26
Tarpon are desirable game fish not only due to their unique proclivity for
testing an angler’s skill, but because these fish seem to prefer waters where
anglers can watch every step of the drama unfold before their eyes. Adult
tarpon typically inhabit the relatively shallow water closer to shore.27 When
tarpon travel through shallow waters along coastal flats, they are easier to

17

Id.
Telephone Interview with Dr. Aaron Adams, Director, Bonefish & Tarpon Trust (Oct.
16, 2014).
19 A Summary of the Tarpon Life Cycle, BONEFISH & TARPON TR., http://www.bonefishtar
pontrust.org/terms-of-use/a-summary-of-the-tarpon-life-cycle.html.
20 Id.
21
16 U.S.C. § 1453(7) (2012).
22 A Summary of the Tarpon Life Cycle, supra note 19.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Tarpon: Silver King of the Coast, supra note 11, at 1.
26 Id. at 1, 3.
27 Adams et al., supra note 5.
18
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“sight fish”—that is, an angler can spot the fish before casting. Their
preference for warm, shallow water, along with the unique behaviors of
tarpon28—like their ability to gulp air at the water’s surface—allow anglers
to more easily detect the fish’s presence. The angler can then carefully
watch the movement of the fish, and attempt to beguile the fish into eating an
artificial, or sometimes baited, lure. The combination of all these
characteristics makes tarpon an exciting challenge for recreational fishermen.
Individuals often spend large portions of their income to pursue these
monstrous trophy fish, which has helped to grow a burgeoning sport-fishing
industry.29 While visiting Gulf Coast towns, anglers hire guides, rent hotels,
and visit retail shops.30 The proximity of towns to waters frequented by
tarpon and other gamefish supports entire communities.31 As the fish are
drawn towards bait, excited fishermen are attracted to the prospective bite of
a dream come true—hooking up with a giant. The recreational fishing
industry that has grown around these magnificent fish generates more than
$6 billion per year for coastal states in the United States alone.32 Tarpon are
therefore a valuable contributor to regional economies purely for recreational
purposes.
Tarpon are not harvested commercially in the United States.33 These fish
are extremely bony and very muscular.34 This biological structure renders

28

James Green, Tarpon, Breathing Air and Making Daisy Chains, DROWNING WORMS (June
12, 2014), http://drowningworms.com/tarpon-breathing-air-making-daisy-chains/ (describing
behaviors like “daisy chaining,” which is a “colloquial name for when a group of fish bump, rub
against, and follow each other around in a constant circle or wheel”).
29 Rusty Fly Charters, HAWKS CAY RESORT, https://www.hawkscay.com/experience/flori
da-keys-fishing-charters/rusty-fly-charters (listing the price of a guide for one full day of
tarpon fishing at $750).
30 See A Typical Day of Tarpon Fishing, GREAT ALASKA, http://www.greatalaska.com/
pages/_a_typical_day_of_tarpon_fishing/199.php (describing a typical tarpon fishing trip).
31 See, e.g., Anthony J. Fedler & Craig Hayes, Economic Impact of Recreational Fishing
for Bonefish, Permit and Tarpon in Belize for 2007 (Apr. 2008), http://www.nautilusreels.
com/app/webroot/userfiles/66/bpt%20economic%20report%20-%20final2.pdf (describing the
impact that guided fishing trips from both lodges and independent guides have on local
economies in Belize); Tony Fedler, Economic Impact of the Florida Keys Flats Fishery,
BONEFISH & TARPON TRUST (May 29, 2013), http://lkga.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/
BTT-Keys-Economic-Report.pdf (detailing the specific regional impact of sport fishing on
communities in the Florida Keys).
32 Tarpon Federal Gamefish Initiative, FLA. FLY FISHING MAG., Mar. 2012, at 41.
33 Adams et al., supra note 5 (describing the use and trade of tarpon).
34 Jeff Dennis, Tarpon Report for the Coastal Lowcountry, THE COLLETONIAN, Sept. 26,
2012, http://thecolletonian.com/tarpon-report-for-the-coastal-lowcountry/.
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tarpon undesirable for most consumers.35 However, the lack of a large
commercial fishery to process tarpon does not mean the fish are not routinely
killed in some parts of the country for sport.36 Similarly, throughout Central
and South America, local fishermen and women regularly harvest tarpon.37
Tarpon and their eggs are also consumed in Central and South American
countries.38
III. DECLINING TARPON STOCKS POSE A PROBLEM
Tarpon currently face several challenges including, chiefly,
overharvesting of the species.39 Tarpon are occasionally killed recreationally
in the United States.40 For instance, certain tarpon fishing tournaments are
held every year and often result in the death of tarpon.41 Of greater concern
to the continued existence of the species is their repeated harvest outside of
the United States’ territorial waters. Tarpon are often taken as incidental
catch by long-lines and gill nets in both the broader Caribbean and Mexico
and sold commercially.42
An additional and related concern with overharvesting these fish is the
likelihood of catch-and-release mortality. Improper angling etiquette
produces a strong negative impact on the health of the fishery.43 For
example, shark attacks are a more common cause of mortality for tarpon
after they are successfully landed and released on extremely light tackle
because the tarpon are exhausted.44 Likewise, in the recent past, Floridian
35

Id.
See Pete McDonald, Tarpon: Spearfishing? Seriously?, FISHING JONES (Mar. 12, 2008),
http://fishingjones.com/2008/03/12/tarpon-spearfishing/ (reporting on spearfishing tournaments
for tarpon). See also 2008 Fish Pics, HELL DIVERS SPEARFISHING CLUB http://helldivers.org/pics/
2008/fish_pics.php (showing tarpon killed while spearfishing in pictures 28, 62, 63, 86, and
possibly 88).
37 See Scott Alford, 73 Texas Tarpon Killed in May!!, HOUSTON CHRON. (June 25, 2007,
11:59 AM), http://blog.chron.com/outdoorseasons/2007/06/73-texas-tarpon-killed-in-may/
(describing a “kill tournament” in Mexico where anglers focused on harvesting tarpon for a
monetary prize).
38 Tarpon: Silver King of the Coast, supra note 11, at 3.
39 Adams et al., supra note 5.
40
McDonald, supra note 36.
41 Alford, supra note 37.
42 Adams et al., supra note 5.
43 Telephone Interview with Dr. Aaron Adams, supra note 18.
44 FISH & WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMM’N, Summary Report on the Catch-and-Release
Mortality Study on Tarpon in Boca Grande Pass, 2002–2004, at 4 (2013), http://myfwc.com/
media/2646572/2002-2004-report-updated.pdf.
36
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anglers would “snag” a tarpon by hooking it outside of its mouth rather than
hooking the fish in the corner of the mouth as is customarily practiced. Such
practices resulted in much higher mortality rates for caught tarpon.45 This
led to Florida prohibiting the use of certain jigs that snagged tarpon instead
of hooking them properly.46
The consumptive element of the tarpon fishery is not the only problem
facing these fish. Habitat destruction and the alteration of freshwater flows
into estuaries where juveniles develop all pose significant problems to the
fishery.47 According to Dr. Aaron Adams, director of the Bonefish and
Tarpon Trust, one of the largest threats to the long-term sustainability of the
United States’ fishery is the destruction and alteration of habitat for juvenile
tarpon.48 The most serious forms of habitat destruction are the diversion of
fresh water from mangrove and marsh areas, filling in mangrove wetlands
and salt marshes for development, cutting down mangroves for wood
products, and pollution.49
Juvenile tarpon require specific environmental conditions that foster a
safe development into adulthood.50 Altering freshwater flows into the
estuarine environments where juvenile tarpon develop imperils both the
health of tarpon populations and that fragile habitat.51 For instance, if
freshwater is continually released into estuaries for a sustained period of
time, certain sea grasses will die due to an alteration of water salinity
levels.52 This begins a chain reaction, as the organisms that rely on sea grass
habitats will also be forced to leave the area or potentially die.53 In turn,

45 Randy Wayne White, Fishing’s Dirty Little Secret: Critics Say Tarpon Actually Are
Snagged With This Popular Style of Boca Grande Pass Fishing, TAMPA TRIB., Apr. 14, 2013,
http://tbo.com/list/news-opinion-commentary/fishings-dirty-little-secret--critics-say-tarpon-act
ually-are--snagged-with-this--popular-style-of--boca-grande-pass--fishing-b82477710z1.
46 FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 68B-32.006 (2013).
47 Telephone Interview with Dr. Aaron Adams, supra note 18 (listing mangrove
destruction, pollution/destruction of estuaries, anglers “snagging” tarpon rather than hooking
them, the use of “circle” hooks instead of “j” hooks, and gill netting practices as destructive
elements of the fishery).
48 Adams et al., supra note 5.
49 Juvenile Tarpon Habitat Initiative, BONEFISH & TARPON TR., http://www.bonefishtarpon
trust.org/juvenile-tarpon-habitat-program/juvenile-tarpon-habitat-program.html; Habitat
Conservation, BONEFISH & TARPON TR., https://www.bonefishtarpon trust.org/habitat-conserv
ation.html.
50 Habitat Conservation, supra note 49.
51 Telephone Interview with Dr. Aaron Adams, supra note 18.
52 Habitat Conservation, supra note 49.
53 Id.
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fewer game fish will inhabit these areas due to a diminished food supply and
the absence of an area to safely avoid the presence of predators. The same
scenario would likely apply to mangrove habitats as well: by altering the
basic components of an ecosystem, more complex organisms may be unable
to survive.54 While these important, foundational species may be able to live
in environments with higher levels of freshwater temporarily, they will likely
succumb to competition by other plant species if the system changes to a
largely freshwater environment.55 This reaction results in the loss of habitat
available to juvenile tarpon.56 Altering these important juvenile fish habitats
invites disaster for coastal game fish because the adult tarpon population
cannot grow or even exist if juveniles disappear.57
Threats to tarpon populations are therefore exacerbated by the tarpon’s
biology and life cycle. Since juvenile tarpon require specific habitats to
grow and develop, habitat protection is crucial to protecting the health of the
entire population, especially when considering the slow growth rate of
tarpon.58 Moreover, assuming natural reproduction rates, the destruction of
juvenile tarpon habitats, or the harvest of juvenile fish, could have drastically
negative effects on future levels of the population because the stock will not
replenish itself quickly since tarpon require ten years to reach sexual
maturity.59 Tarpon therefore are unable to respond to shocks in population
levels quickly. Thus, the destruction of juvenile habitat coupled with
excessive harvest of mature tarpon could effectively cripple local populations
of tarpon. This in turn may lead to a decrease in the numbers of tarpon that
follow traditional migration patterns.
A. Classic Remedies to the Problems Tarpon Create
Economists have long recognized the inherent difficulties of sustainably
managing a public resource like tarpon. This is generally categorized as a
collective action problem and, more specifically, labeled as a tragedy of the
commons. However, there are more elements to the problem than just
managing a fishery in one discrete location. Tarpon migrate significant
54

Id.
Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 A Summary of the Tarpon Life Cycle, supra note 19 (noting tarpon live upwards of eighty
years).
59 Id.
55
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distances across international borders. Thus, the harms inflicted by the
tragedy of the commons have international ramifications. International law
has developed important principles to attempt to minimize the effects of
cross-border, or transboundary, harms. The following sections outline the
typical remedies to problems posed by efforts to sustainably manage tarpon.
1. Tragedy of the Commons/Collective Action Problem
Economists conventionally lump fisheries management into a type of
collective action problem known as a “tragedy of the commons.”60 Typically
a tragedy of the commons arises when rational consumers of a public
resource face no incentive to align their use with the long-term interests of
the community.61 In other words, each rational user of the commons seeks to
gather as much of the resource as they can, without regard to the overall
management of the resource.62 Other users of the commons harvest any
resource another user voluntarily refrains from exploiting, as the commons
are open to all.63 The end result is the total consumption of the commons,
since no rational actor would voluntarily cease exploiting the shared
resource.64
a. Solutions to a Tragedy of the Commons Problem
To combat a typical tragedy of the commons, classical economic analysis
has developed four basic solutions. First, the commons may be divided up,
and individuals may be given private property rights to a section of the
commons.65 Creating a private property right should effectively incentivize
individuals to use the commons sustainably.66 For their portion of the
commons to remain productive, these individuals can no longer extract the

60 Rouba Al-Fattal, The Tragedy of the Commons: Institutions and Fisheries Management
at the Local and EU Levels, 21 REV. POL. ECON. 4, 537–47 (2009).
61 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243–48 (1968).
62
Id. at 1244.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1245.
66 See Jonathan H. Adler, Property Rights and the Tragedy of the Commons, THE
ATLANTIC, May 22, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/05/property-right
s-and-the-tragedy-of-the-commons/257549/.
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benefits of the resource without crafting a plan to replenish it.67 This method
internalizes the externalities, making individual actors account for the costs
of their actions, and hopefully prompts those actors to take effective
measures to ensure the long-term health of their portion of the commons.68
An example of a regime that created property rights in order to better
manage a fishery is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).69 UNCLOS created five categorical zones based on the distance
from a nation’s shores in nautical miles and allocated different property
rights to the resources found within each zone, including rights to manage
the fisheries located in those waters. The drafters and signees hoped that
UNCLOS would increase coastal states’ abilities to manage fisheries
responsibly.70
However, results under this regime have been disappointing to say the
least.71 Creating property rights, specifically by designating territories that
may be fished among nations, has facilitated unprecedented exploitation.72
Property rights incentivized states to subsidize their commercial fishing
operations to encourage the development of domestic fishing industries.73
The robust growth of domestic fishing activities in turn led to dramatic
increases in overfishing.74 The exclusive right to access fish in given
stretches of waters, coupled with greater access to technology, incentivized
and activated domestic commercial fishermen. These modern operations
more closely resemble floating vacuum cleaners than traditional hook-andline fishing.75 Because the creation and implementation of property rights in
the context of international fisheries seems to have furthered problems
related to overfishing, the creation of property rights alone is not an effective
solution to the problem of sustainably managing migratory fish.76
67

Id. (noting that the creation of well-defined and secure property rights incentives
individuals to “car[e] for the underlying resource and prevent[ ] its overuse”).
68 Id.
69 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
70 DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY 763 (4th ed. 2011) (“Thus when the exclusive economic zones were created in
UNCLOS, placing 90% of the world’s fish catch within national jurisdictions, it was thought that
this would encourage strict national oversight to ensure conservation of domestic fish stocks.”).
71 Id. at 763–64.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 761–64.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1047–68.
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Another potential remedy to the tragedy of the commons would be to
increase the size of the commons. By increasing the commons’ size, the
immediate degradation is not realized as quickly. If the size of the commons
can be continually increased, then its destruction can be effectively
postponed. While this is paradoxical to explain, because in reality resources
are finite, there may be some measure of applicability in the context of
fisheries management. For instance, if tarpon were raised in commercial
hatcheries and subsequently released into the wild, the overall stock of
tarpon could theoretically be increased indefinitely.
For example, aquaculture, has been one of the fastest growing industries
in recent years, outpacing the growth of traditional food sources.77 While
aquaculture has been effective in growing food sources, it remains to be seen
if aquaculture could be an effective technique for increasing the populations
of game fish.78
The final two remedies to a tragedy of the commons are different
techniques for implementing the same strategy. The third solution limits the
effects of self-interest by establishing rules as social norms that seek to
exclude and govern the commons.79 This solution targets the lack of
enforcement ability for shared resources.80 In the international context, these
types of solutions merit substantial attention.81
77 See generally FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UK, THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND
AQUACULTURE (2014), available at http://www.fao.org/3/d1eaa9a1-5a71-Ac42-86cO-f211f0
7de16/i3720e.pdf (explaining the state of aquaculture and the outlook for the future of
aquaculture around the world).
78 See SCDNR Makes Huge Redfish Stocking in Chechessee River, S.C. SPORTSMAN, Dec.
12, 2013, http://www.southcarolinasportsman.com/details.php?id=3460 (describing efforts of
the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources to increase the population levels of
redfish, a recognized game fish in the state of South Carolina, via fish hatched from wildcaught redfish). See also Zach Murdock, State Scientists to Stock Chechessee River with
100,000 Red Drum, THE STATE, Dec. 8, 2013, http://www.thestate.com/lastest-news/article/
3831244.html (detailing further the restocking efforts of the South Carolina Department of
Natural Resources for redfish).
79 See generally Flavio Felice & Massimiliano Vatiero, Elinor Ostrom and the Solution to the
Tragedy of the Commons, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (June 27, 2012), http://www.aei.
org/publication/elinor-ostrom-and-the-solution-to-the-tragedy-of-the-commons/ (explaining that
shared societal norms developed from the largest, most basic unit of society and progressing
upwards to governance and legal rules can effectively solve the problem that is the tragedy of the
commons).
80 Id.
81 Id. (describing specific communities in Japan, Spain, the Philippines, and Italy where
rules for public planning resulted from bottom up to assure sustainability of common
resources).
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Alternatively, the fourth and final solution requires shaping legal rules to
encourage a cooperative environment. This can be accomplished by
allowing locally shared traditions to govern.82 Traditions can have the effect
of more formal enforcement provisions, but are by nature not actual rules.83
By incorporating these norms into legislation, the regulator can provide teeth
to previously unenforceable standards.
For instance, the Maori people of the Pacific Islands represent a unique
example of how standards can be developed to reflect societal norms. The
Maori people created a property regime, te tikanga o te moana, that
addresses the tragedy of the commons by incorporating the Maori beliefs
regarding the ocean.84 The Maori property regime combines a shared set of
norms among its people that sets standards far above simply maintaining
levels of fish.85 Instead, the Maori property regime recognizes that the best
interests of the collective community revolve around sustainably managing
the harvesting of resources.86
2. International Law’s Treatment of Transboundary Harms
Since tarpon flow, or migrate, across international boundaries, the
consequences of deciding whether to regulate the fishery can be considered a
type of transboundary harm; specifically, a transboundary harm to a natural
resource. The effect of pollutants as a transboundary harm to natural
resources was the subject of the Trail Smelter Arbitration, which concerned a
dispute between United States apple growers and a Canadian smelting
plant.87 In Trail Smelter, a Canadian smelting plant generated transboundary
pollutants that negatively affected apple growers’ crops in the United
States.88 The arbitrator held that the Canadian smelter was liable for the
injuries to trees, soil, and crop yield suffered by the United States apple
farmers resulting from the smelter’s emission of sulfur dioxide.89 The Trail
Smelter Arbitration is therefore a seminal case in the development of
82 Id. (explaining that when conflict resolution measures are local and public, a mutual
control of the resource among the users themselves may be established which facilitates its
proper management).
83
Id.
84 HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 70, at 754–55.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941).
88 Id.
89 Id.
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international environmental law because it laid the foundation for the “no
harm” rule when addressing transboundary harms.90 One way to consider
this problem is to evaluate the management of a fishery across political
borders as transboundary harm. It seems to follow, under the principles of
Trail Smelter, that one state may owe a duty to another to do no harm to that
fishery. However, the realities of the situation do not mesh quite as neatly
into such an outcome. Unlike Trail Smelter, where pollutants traversed
international borders to cause tangible harms to fixed resources, if fish that
typically migrate from one country’s coastal waters to another are harvested
in the upstream state there is nothing to physically harm in the downstream
state. In other words, the consumption of the resource in one country does
not destroy or damage the downstream state beyond interfering with its
opportunity to also exploit that resource.
The effects of transboundary harms were also the subject of a famous
dispute between Argentina and Uruguay.91 In the Case Concerning Pulp
Mills on the River Uruguay, Argentina filed a complaint with the
International Court of Justice alleging that the construction of pulp mills in
Uruguay along a border river was producing pollution in unreasonable
amounts, and therefore harming Argentine waterways.92 Furthermore,
Argentina alleged that it was not properly notified by Uruguay pursuant to an
international agreement.93 The court ultimately noted that Argentina did not
submit sufficient evidence demonstrating that Uruguay failed to employ the
best available practices in attempting to mitigate any environmental harm. 94
However, the most important conclusion of the court involved the
requirement to properly notify countries that would be potentially affected.
Although Argentina was not a party to the agreement it cited in an attempt to
require Uruguay to take additional steps to reduce pollutants, the court
recognized an obligation to inform and notify affected states when actions
are taken that will foreseeably result in transboundary harms.95
The court also discussed the importance of conducting environmental
assessments before beginning an activity that may result in transboundary

90

Jutta Brunnée, The United States and International Environmental Law: Living With an
Elephant, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 617, 628 (2004).
91 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uruguay), 2010 I.C.J. 14 (Apr. 20).
92 Id. at 25–26.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 74–75.
95 Id. at 59–61.
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harm.96 The importance of environmental assessments should not be
minimized. In the context of tarpon management, an environmental
assessment would account for where fish are harvested, at what stage in the
life cycle the harvesting typically occurs, and the ramifications of harvest on
both the gene pool and population levels.97 Requiring a nation to conduct an
environmental assessment before undertaking to develop a new industry
effectively promulgates levels of information that would allow for more
informed decision-making.98
This particular transboundary harm arises as a combination of fisheries
management and protection of the interests of private citizens. Fish are not
aware of international borders, and thus travel without concern for
regulations in one state as opposed to another. Policies that promote
harvesting fish in an upstream state undermine industries dependent on those
fish in downstream states.99 For example, if tarpon are caught for their roe in
Mexico, they are permanently removed from the population available to the
sport fishing industry in the United States.100 The disappearance of those
fish would clearly have a negative impact on the United States sport fishing
industry, which happens to be downstream in the tarpon migration pattern.101
Tarpon in that instance are merely a specific example illustrative of a larger
problem. The question remains, how can countries legislate, or refrain from
legislating, in a manner that maximizes the benefit of these migratory species
of fish to each country without making a certain country less well off.102

96

Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uruguay), 2010 I.C.J. 14 (Apr. 20), at 59–60.
See Tarpon Research, BONEFISH & TARPON TRUST (2013), http://www.bonefishtarpon
trust.org/tarpon-research/tarpon-research.html (describing conditions that affect the overall
health of tarpon populations and development).
98 HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 70, at 498.
99 See, e.g., Tarpon Genetics Program, BONEFISH & TARPON TRUST, https://www.bonefish
tarpontrust.org/tarpon-genetics-program/tarpon-genetics-program.html (discussing tarpon as
potentially part of a single population such that fish that are harvested by Latin American
countries may directly affect the size of the population available for the rest of the region).
100 Tarpon Research, supra note 97.
101 Id.
102 See Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Efficiency, Pareto, and Kaldor-Hicks,
LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Jan. 25, 2009), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2009/01/legaltheory-lexicon-efficiency-pareto-and-kaldorhicks.html (explaining Pareto efficiency versus
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency to urge resource allocation efficiency in regulation).
97
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3. A Coasian Approach?
Another potential solution to fisheries management problems may be
found in the application of the Coase Theorem. Many take Coase’s famous
theorem to suggest that legal rules are unimportant since parties can
effectively bargain around the rules as they see fit.103 However, in the real
world, transaction costs pose significant obstacles for negotiations between
parties.104 Coase’s reasoning can also be understood as recognizing the
articulation of a dynamic standard.105 Coase was not foolish enough to
simply ignore the existence of transaction costs. On the contrary, the Coase
Theorem implicitly acknowledges a dynamic relationship between the
creation of legal rules and the potential to bargain effectively.106 As
transaction costs rise, the bargaining process breaks down, requiring the
implementation of an effective legal rule.107 Where transaction costs are low,
a legal rule merely serves as an impetus to get interested parties into the
same room and working towards a solution.108
In the context of managing migratory fish populations, the Coase
Theorem would suggest that the more important question is whether or not
states should attempt to regulate or negotiate around this problem. Perhaps
that question is even better structured as deciding whether the industries
affected in downstream states should attempt to bargain an efficient outcome
with actors in upstream states.
4. Summary
On the whole, there are several different conceptual strategies that guide
efforts to sustainably manage fish populations. The first set of strategies
classifies the problem as a tragedy of the commons and then addresses the

103 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (describing how the
establishment of a property rule or a liability rule in favor of one party does not foreclose the
other party from bargaining to a more efficient resolution of the problem).
104 Timothy B. Lee, The Coase Theorem Is Widely Cited In Economics. Ronald Coase
Hated It, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Sept. 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
wonkblog/wp/2013/09/04/the-coase-theorem-is-widely-cited-in-economics-ronald-coase-hate
d-it/.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
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different characteristics that create a tragedy of the commons. Those
characteristics include: lack of an ownership incentive to maintain the
commons, the finite nature of resources in a commons, and finally the lack of
governance over common resources. To combat the problems these
characteristics pose, regulations can divide the commons into individual
parcels, attempt to increase the pool of commons resources, or institute rules
for the commons via exclusion or societal pressures on responsible use.
The second set of strategies address the international nature of the issues
attached to managing tarpon. Because these fish migrate across boundaries,
the actions of one state to regulate the fishery can affect other states
negatively. International law has developed rational methods to mitigate
these types of transboundary harms.
The final major strategy identifies the problem as one of transaction costs.
For instance, stakeholders should be able to get together and debate
appropriate use of the fishery. However, because the transaction costs of
attempting that solution are so high, rules need to be instituted to force the
bargaining to take place. All of these strategies are different routes that seek
to arrive at the same destination: the successful management of a healthy
fishery that incorporates relevant stakeholder concerns.
B. Current Regulatory Schemes in Place to Manage Tarpon Fisheries
1. Domestic Efforts
By contributing to the stabilization of population levels, game fish
protection has helped sustain the growth of what has become a robust sportfishing industry for several fish species.109 In the United States, tarpon are
protected as game fish in a few states, however legislation has not been
enacted at the federal level.110 Protected game fish may still be chased,
casted at, caught, and kept; the important part of protection afforded by
federal game fish status is that the fish may not be commercially

109 See, e.g., Federal Government Confirms Red Drum and Striped Bass Gamefish Status,
AMERICAN SPORTFISHING ASS’N (Oct. 17, 2008), http://asafishing.org/newsroom/news-release
s/federal-government-confirms-red-drum-and-striped-bass-gamefish-status/
(noting
that
gamefish status for these species “insures the recreational, economic, and environmental
benefits of two of the most popular gamefish in the United States”).
110 See CCA National Accomplishments, COASTAL CONSERVATION ASS’N MISSISSIPPI,
https://www.cca.ms/about-cca/national-accomplishments/ (listing regulations attaining game
fish status for tarpon in certain states).
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harvested.111 When discussing the game fishing industry that has developed
around tarpon in the United States, it is important to remember that this
fishing is not aimed at catching tarpon for private or public consumption.
Therefore, for game fish status to provide substantial protection, it should
include a ban on recreational harvest as well.112
Since tarpon have not yet been federally protected in the United States,
the management of tarpon is left to each individual state. However,
individual state regulations vary widely. Florida designated tarpon as a
“catch-and-release only” species in 2013.113 Several other states have
adopted minimum size requirements for harvesting tarpon.114 Louisiana
represents the opposite end of the United States’ regulatory spectrum, as they
have consistently refused to regulate the tarpon fishery in any way.115
Currently, there is an effort by non-governmental organizations in the United
States to engage in a state-by-state push to declare tarpon a game fish.116
In addition to campaigning for each state to enact statutes or regulations
protecting tarpon, current domestic efforts represent a concentrated push for
the federal government to recognize tarpon as a game fish. Federal
recognition should incentivize the states to manage the tarpon in their waters
according to the requirements of the federal government, which could
include catch and release only status. A federal ban on harvest would need
to be implemented at the state level, encouraging the states to cooperate with
federal fisheries managers to ensure state and federal regulations protect this
important fishery.117 Federal game fish status could also potentially provide
leverage for the United States to work with neighboring countries to institute
a regional management plan for tarpon.118

111 See Federal Government Confirms Red Drum and Striped Bass Gamefish Status, supra
note 109 (explaining the meaning of federal game fish status and how that status affects red
drum and striped bass).
112 Adams et al., supra note 5 (stating that tarpon were recreationally harvested even after
achieving gamefish status).
113
FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 68B-32.004 (2013).
114 Fishing Regulations List, BONEFISH & TARPON TR., http://www.bonefishtarpontrust.org/
general/fishing-regulations-list.html.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Tarpon Federal Gamefish Initiative, supra note 32, at 40–41.
118 Id.
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2. International Protections
Currently UNCLOS Article 64 and Annex 1 govern the regulation of
migratory fish populations.119 All of the major states bordering the Gulf of
Mexico that are impacted by the migration of tarpon have, at a minimum,
ratified the portion of UNCLOS covering both straddling stocks and highly
migratory fish stocks.120 The pertinent provision of Article 64 provides that
states must “cooperate directly or through appropriate international
organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the
objective of optimum utilization of such species throughout the region.”121
Article 64 does not itself explicitly define what classifies a species as a
“highly migratory.”122 Instead, Annex 1 to UNLCOS simply lists several
species of fish that are highly migratory.123 Tarpon are not among the
species listed as highly migratory.124 Therefore, since the textual provisions
of the treaty do not include tarpon, the obligations contained in Article 64
arguably do not apply to these fish.
Article 64 is part of the broader provision in UNCLOS establishing
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ).125 States have exclusive rights to exploit
the living resources within 200 miles of their coastlines according to Articles
56 and 57 of UNCLOS.126 UNCLOS also creates an obligation for states to
“promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living resources” found
within the states’ EEZ.127 Therefore, while tarpon may not be specifically
covered in the highly migratory species provisions of UNCLOS, they
arguably would fall under the more general requirements so that they, as a
resource, must be “optimally utilized.”128 Therein lies the problem: because
tarpon are not harvested on a large-scale commercial basis, the fish are
largely ignored in overarching regulatory regimes aimed at sustainable use
and management of fisheries. However, simply because these fish are not
119

UNCLOS, supra note 69, art. 64.
United Nations: Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists of
Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements
(Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological _lists_of_ratificatio
ns.htm.
121 UNCLOS, supra note 69, art. 64.
122
Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. arts. 56(1)(a), 57.
127 Id. art. 62(1).
128 Id.
120
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vacuumed from the seas does not mean the fishery is not imperiled by other
sources. Additionally, there is not a clear understanding of what exactly
“promoting optimum use” requires of states. This is not a problem unique to
tarpon. UNCLOS has been criticized for its lack of concrete obligations,
especially in regards to safeguarding and managing living resources.129
Thus, relying on UNCLOS to regulate the tarpon fishery in a sustainable
manner seems to be misguided.
Furthermore, each country’s individual regulations regarding tarpon are
little better than the current international framework.130 The legal regimes
specifically governing the harvest of tarpon in each nation through which
tarpon migrate are patchwork at best.131 Similar to the current situation in
the United States, these individual countries also lack sufficient regulation at
the federal level. For example, Mexico does not regulate the tarpon fishery
in any way other than to impose a “two per person per day” rule.132 Belize
has adopted “catch-and-release” status for tarpon, but these regulations are
not stringently enforced.133 Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands
all currently have regulations in place maintaining that tarpon are catch-andrelease only.134 However, these states seem to be either unwilling or unable
to effectively enforce those regulations that are in place. Many other states
throughout the greater Caribbean, including the Bahamas, do not have
regulations addressing tarpon; those regulations that do exist are simply not
adequate to effectively sustain populations of tarpon.135
IV. REFRAMING THE PROBLEM
The migratory nature of tarpon contributes to many of the problems these
fish face. Tarpon migrate in long chains, often hundreds of fish long. These
chains seem to flow through the shallow emerald waters much like a river
through the ocean. Harm to the population occurring in one part of the globe
affects the viability of tarpon populations along the entire migration route.
Perhaps principles gleaned from customary international law or agreements
129

See Robert Beckman & Tara Davenport, The EEZ Regime: Reflections after 30 Years, in
LOSI CONFERENCE PAPERS 2012, at 31 (Harry N. Scheiber & Moon Sang Kwon eds., 2012),
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Beckman-Davenport-final.pdf.
130 Fishing Regulations List, supra note 114.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Telephone Interview with Dr. Aaron Adams, supra note 18.
134 Fishing Regulations List, supra note 114.
135 Id.
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governing rivers can provide an enlightening perspective from which a
model to protect tarpon can be derived.
A. International Riparian Rights
River systems have been fairly recent subjects of substantial international
disputes. Generally, water law seeks to allocate risk.136 An additional
foundational premise to water law is that all states whose territory is adjacent
to a body of water have a right to make reasonable use of the water located
within their territory.137 Thus, all states typically agree that only those states
with territory bordering rivers or through which a river flows have any legal
claim to an apportionment of the water flowing across or along their
territory.138 The main area of concern with water rights aims to ensure that a
river’s rate of flow is maintained throughout the course of the waterway.139
Upstream states usually argue for “absolute territorial sovereignty”
principles, which dictate that states should have complete dominion over the
resources passing through their territories.140 On the other hand, downstream
states typically advocate for the “absolute integrity of the watercourse,”
which requires both the river’s quantity and quality of water flow remain
unaltered throughout its course.141 However, neither of these absolutist
approaches typically carry the day. Instead, optimal allocation and use of the
available water resources requires coordination among all of the actors
seeking to affect the flow of water. The major legal doctrines that have
developed to help countries solve disputes over how much an individual state
may restrict the flow of international rivers have evolved from
straightforward equitable apportionment, coupled with “do no harm” and
“prior notice” principles, to basin-wide management.

136 A. Dan Tarlock, How Well Can International Water Allocation Regimes Adapt to Global
Climate Change, 15 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 423, 428 (2000), reprinted in 15 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 423, 428 (2008).
137
Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Customary International Law of Transboundary Fresh
Waters, 1 INT. J. GLOBAL ENVTL. ISSUES 264, 269–73, 276–87 (2001).
138 Id. at 269.
139 A. Dan Tarlock, Four Challenges for International Water Law, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 369,
372, 374–75 (2010).
140 Id. at 373 n.11, 375 n.26.
141 Dellapenna, supra note 137, at 269.
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1. Equitable Apportionment
The doctrine of equitable apportionment evolved to address the demands
of upstream states for absolute territorial sovereignty. The doctrine
essentially splits the baby between upstream states and downstream states,
declaring that “upstream states do not have an absolute right to control and
use all the water that originates in their territories.”142 Further, “downstream
states do not have the corresponding right to block upstream development by
demanding the unimpeded flow of a river into their territories.”143 Put
simply, fairness concerns dictate the ultimate result that “no riparian state
should be able to unilaterally preclude other states from using their fair share
of an international river.”144 This is a logical resolution to the water usage
demands of upstream and downstream states. Neither can have an
unimpeded flow at the other’s expense; therefore, the right to use water must
somehow be fairly allocated amongst the interested nations.
The doctrine of equitable apportionment derives its modern formulation
from a combination of the United States Supreme Court jurisprudence,145 the
Helsinki Rules, their modern reformulation—the Berlin Rules, and the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercoures (Watercourses Convention).146 The Watercourses
Convention entered into force in 2014 and focuses on fostering global
cooperation in the use of transboundary water resources.147
The
Watercourses Convention is commonly regarded as a proper attempt at
codifying customary international law.148 Even the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) has stepped in to defend equitable apportionment’s status as
customary international law.149
In light of its widespread support, equitable apportionment has become
the international norm in determining water rights entitlements.150 Perhaps
142

Tarlock, supra note 139, at 375.
Id.
144 Id.
145 Dellapenna, supra note 137, at 276.
146 Tarlock, supra note 139, at 376.
147
United Nations Watercourses Convention Enters Into Force, UNITED NATIONS (Aug. 18,
2014), http://www.unwatercoursesconvention.org/news/united-nations-watercourses-convent
ion-enters-into-force/.
148 Tarlock, supra note 139, at 376.
149 Id. at 377.
150 A. Dan Tarlock & Patricia Wouters, Are Shared Benefits of International Waters an
Equitable Apportionment?, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 523, 524 (2007).
143
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the most important component of the principle of equitable apportionment, as
an organizing approach to assigning water rights, is a strenuous objection to
the practice of an upstream or downstream state unilaterally damming or
diverting a river’s flow.151 The modern development of the doctrine seeks to
address concerns over singular state action. Evidence of the doctrine’s
growth can be found in the growing tide of scholars who argue that the focus
of equitable apportionment should shift from strictly dividing the existing
water-quantity resources towards a more holistic allocation of the overall
benefits received.152
Since unilateral action on the part of either an upstream or downstream
riparian state is typically discouraged, states must attempt to cooperate in
order to develop a system that apportions rights to river flows fairly between
the parties.153 Equitable apportionment can take at least two forms in
encouraging cooperation among states. The first form of equitable
apportionment, classic, considers only states whose watersheds contribute to
the river basin.154 Classic equitable apportionment would only account for
those countries with an interest in the riparian rights; therefore, the equitable
apportionment would be a simple and straightforward division of the water
between the interested basin parties.155
The other formulation of equitable apportionment, shared benefits, forces
states to consider the overall output of the riparian system. 156 States must
take into account a number of factors, including economic savings from the
allocation of rights to dam the river, to determine the overall level of benefit
provided by the waterway.157 In practice, states are typically compensated
with money for waiving their claims to the use and control of water.158 The
shared benefits approach requires basin-wide management of transboundary

151

Id. at 524–25.
Id. at 527.
153 But see Tarlock, supra note 139, at 376–78 (discussing how the real world practice of
equitable apportionment has been only a minimal success); Dellapenna, supra note 137, at 376
(arguing that while an accepted principle of international law, equitable apportionment
typically fails without strong institutional monitoring).
154
Scott O. McKenzie, Note, Egypt’s Choice: From the Nile Basin Treaty to the
Cooperative Framework Agreement, an International Legal Analysis, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 571, 588–94 (2012).
155 Id.
156 Id. at 591–92.
157 Id.
158 Tarlock, supra note 139, at 397.
152
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rivers through cooperation among all states.159 The most successful example
of a treaty that adopted the shared benefits approach to equitable
apportionment is the agreement between the United States and Canada
regarding the Columbia River Basin.160 Part of the treaty’s success story is
its demonstration of the positive results of cooperation in management of the
river.
Additionally, the “do no harm” principle of customary international law
has helped animate the concept of transboundary river management,
especially when considering the justifications for imposing a system based
on equitable apportionment. “Do no harm” means exactly what it says: that
states should act in a way that does not harm co-riparian states.161 An
important corollary to “do no harm” is the timely notification principle,
which calls for adequate notice of riparian developments in a timely
manner.162 If given proper notice and time to prepare, modern engineering
can allow river managers to prevent some harm from occurring.163
The Trail Smelter Arbitration remains as perhaps the best applicable
illustration of the “do no harm” principle. As examined earlier, this
proceeding incorporated the concept that states should act in a way that
avoids harming the interests of other states.164 In fact, the arbitrator relied on
the logic of United States water law to justify its method of addressing
transboundary pollution.165
The holding in Trail Smelter was then
incorporated into a number of international treaties, most notably being
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration in 1972.166 In the same manner,
the principle of timely notification has received widespread support
throughout international law. For example, the Watercourses Convention
provides that “[b]efore undertaking a major development, the moving state
must give ‘timely notification’ to other affected states.”167

159

Id. at 397–402 (describing examples of successful and unsuccessful basin-wide
management).
160 McKenzie, supra note 154, at 592.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 593.
163 Id.
164
Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941).
165 Meredith A. Giordano, Managing the Quality of International Rivers: Global Principles
and Basin Practice, 43 NAT. RES. J. 111, 115 (2003), available at http://lawschool.unm.edu/
nrj/volumes/43/1/05_giordono_quality.pdf.
166 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5–16,
1972, Declaration on the Human Environment, princ. 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14.
167 Tarlock, supra note 139, at 405.
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2. Basin-Wide Management
A different concept developing in international water law is the idea of
basin-wide management of the waterway. In a basin-wide approach,
individual sovereignty of the involved states is limited and therefore
unilateral action is theoretically constrained.168 Basin-wide management
seeks to reflect the natural state of a river basin as a single ecological
system.169 This approach appeals to the principles described above while
recognizing that there is an inherent community of interests among riparian
states that practically demands a unified approach.170 Article 8 of the
Watercourses Convention recognizes and adopts the principle of basin-wide
management.171
These concepts have come to a head in a few important international
disputes. The management of the Nile River in Africa is one such important
dispute because it exhibits the potential benefits from a shared benefits
regime as well as the problems implementing such a system. 172 The Nile is
one of the most stressed rivers in the world, as it has been dammed since the
1950s to provide hydroelectric power and irrigation for crops in the river
delta.173 Egypt has, in practice, had complete legal and political control over
development on the upstream portion of the Nile.174 The Nile Basin
Initiative aimed to disrupt Egypt’s stranglehold on the Nile’s resources by
constructing smaller dams throughout the watershed.175 However, those
projects have caused even further environmental problems as well as serious
social concerns.176

168

Id. at 403.
Scott McKenzie, A River Runs Through It: The Future of the Columbia River Treaty,
Water Rights, Development, and Climate Change, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 921, 948 (2013).
170 Id.
171
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigation Uses of International Watercourses art. 8,
May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 3 [hereinafter Watercourses Convention].
172 McKenzie, supra note 169, at 946–47.
173 Tarlock, supra note 139, at 401–02.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
169

394

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 44:369

B. International Riparian Rights Applied to Tarpon
Tarpon are but one example of a transboundary resource.177 In the same
manner that migratory species of fish in oceanic waters flow through
political boundaries, an international river can traverse political boundaries
along the course of its flow. International states often owe specific duties to
neighboring states into which their rivers flow as a matter of customary
international law.178 However, recent treaties have attempted to codify
customary international law into imposing definite methods to manage the
flows of international rivers. Therefore, by analogizing the current state of
international water rights with the need for adequate protection for tarpon, a
similar regulatory framework may be used to address the concerns of
migratory fisheries management.
Since migratory populations of fish are merely movements of a resource,
much like transboundary rivers, a regulatory regime that effectively manages
movement of water across international boundaries could be applied to the
movement of fish. If fish follow relatively standard migration patterns,
devising a regulatory scheme around the same principles that undergird
international water rights law should address some of the traditional
problems associated with fisheries management that would also theoretically
resolve the problems currently facing the tarpon fishery.
In attempting to craft a legal framework that adequately addresses and
mitigates the aspects of migratory fisheries regulation that resemble a
tragedy of the commons, the most preferable solution would be to encourage
cooperation among nations through which these fish migrate. This can be
accomplished at the international level by encouraging behavior with state
regulation; in other words, using societal pressures and norms to enforce
legislation that may otherwise be unenforceable.179 Such a regime would
potentially reduce costs of enforcement, as the interested parties would
177
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178 HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 70, at 842–88.
179 See Tarpon Federal Gamefish Initiative, supra note 32, at 40–41 (arguing that federal
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recognize the benefits of working together.180 By cooperating to reduce
enforcement costs, each member state could theoretically benefit from the
efforts of the other states, thus maximizing the overall gains.181
Regarding the management of tarpon in the Gulf of Mexico, the number
of states with direct impact on the fishery is relatively small. The United
States would need to be involved in any international cooperation
agreements and would most likely be joined by at least Mexico and Belize.
If scientific research were to show that tarpon migration patterns occur over
much longer distances, or perhaps that some tarpon do traverse the Gulf of
Mexico directly, then obviously more countries would need to be included in
the management of the fishery. This would indicate that proposing a
bilateral, or a regionally focused multilateral agreement, could coordinate
regulation to standardize the treatment of the tarpon fishery throughout the
Gulf.
The doctrine of equitable apportionment provides an excellent starting
place for analogizing the regime currently in place for transboundary riparian
rights to the movement of migratory fish species across different states’
waters. Just as upstream states in a river system do not have an absolute
right to unilaterally control and use the water from that river, neither should
upstream states in a migratory pattern have exclusive rights to the fish that
swim through their territorial waters. The same foundational policy concerns
support both arguments. It would be fundamentally unfair to modify the
flow of a resource so as to preclude downstream states’ significant access to
that resource. The converse to the argument is also true. Again, due to
fairness concerns dictate that downstream states are not entitled to the
unimpeded, natural flow of a resource. A downstream state should not be
able to totally preclude an upstream state from utilizing resources within that
state’s own borders. The question then transforms into the following: since
neither party has the right to ultimate control of the resource, what level of
apportionment between states is appropriate and fair?
Accepting that the equitable apportionment doctrine provides adequate
justification for attempting to impose obligations on both upstream and
downstream states in migratory populations of fish, there then are multiple
180 See Secretariat of the U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification, Opportunities for
Synergy among the Environmental Conventions: Results of National and Local Level
Workshops (2006), available at http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/Publicatio
ns/synergy.pdf (explaining that synergies in environmental regulations can produce greater
overall effects when local governments work together).
181 Id.
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prospective models for attempting to address the challenges of fairly
regulating such a fishery. The first of which is to simply leave the status quo
intact. However, suggesting this strategy would adequately protect the longterm health of the fishery seems to be wishful thinking at best. The lack of
regulation has already resulted in the decline of tarpon populations
throughout the region. Taking no action, but hoping for conditions to
improve seems contradictory and illogical. Indeed, those that have been
most affected have already seen fit to attempt to regulate the fishery.182
Another approach is to adopt a regulatory scheme consistent with the
classic version of equitable apportionment. In that model, only those states
with a direct interest in the resource should be allowed input in deciding how
access to that resource is allocated. This type of regime could function as a
quota system where each affected state is apportioned a number of tarpon it
is allowed to harvest. However, there is no absolute requirement for the
system to implement a property right. As noted earlier, mere property rights
can often exacerbate the problems associated with sustainably managing a
fishery.
Instead, perhaps a more effective solution would be to consider the
allocation of the benefits of accessing the resource. For example, in the
context of riparian systems, the typical question is who is allowed to dam or
divert the flow of a river. What that question is essentially asking is who is
allowed to profit from the resource. In the same manner, profiting from the
resource of tarpon need not be confined to the exclusive right to harvest the
fish. Instead, a profit from the resource of a migratory fish could be
construed to simply be the rights to extract benefits from the fishery. Such a
benefit could be negotiated to require scientific research to be conducted in
the most upstream state, perhaps even dividing up the rights to conduct
research based on the life cycle of the fish, with certain stages of life studied
in certain phases of the fish’s movement.
Such an approach, bargaining for an equitable apportionment among
directly interested parties, need not be limited to governmental actors. For
instance, allowing United States non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
interested in preserving the overall health of the tarpon population to bargain
with individuals in other countries who are more interested in developing
estuaries could result in a favorable outcome for both groups without the
need for burdensome costs on the government. This approach would also be
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consistent with the Coase Theorem but would avoid the implementation of a
possibly unwieldy regulatory regime.
Yet another option would be to adopt a multiparty, basin-wide approach
in line with the shared benefits doctrine discussed above. This approach
addresses the general concerns of fisheries management as a collective action
problem, while also taking full advantage of already developed international
conventions that benefit the tarpon population. Additionally, the strategy
potentially provides a benefit to growing industries in all the affected states.
A basin-wide approach should by necessity involve all stakeholders,
including NGOs already thoroughly invested in the fishery. Such an
approach would need to primarily address the concerns with habitat
destruction, including both the destruction of mangrove habitats and the
alteration of freshwater flows into estuaries, while also taking appropriate
measures to ensure that the fishery is not commercially over-exploited. This
approach should also involve regulating the type of equipment that can be
used to catch tarpon.183
In addition, the basin-wide approach would need to comport with the
shared benefits approach. This type of approach typically results in
economic compensation in return for foregoing use of the resource in an
upstream state. This could take the form of a subsidy, if, for instance, the
United States government decided to simply pay other countries to refrain
from harvesting tarpon, destroying juvenile habitats, or otherwise negatively
impacting the fishery. The revenue to pay for such a subsidy could be
generated by the sport fishing industry. Perhaps simply imposing a small fee
on fishing licenses in downstream states could generate the total payment.
Theoretically, as the tarpon population expands, opportunities should rise to
catch these fish. Assuming demand for tarpon as a trophy fish remains
constant, and that current demand outpaces the availability of guides, more
guides could enter the industry to capitalize on the increased opportunities to
catch tarpon. These increases in numbers of anglers, guides, fishing licenses,
boats, and gas purchases, not to mention other incidental benefits associated
with traveling to catch a prized game fish, should provide a boon to
economies serving the industry.
In deciding what to regulate and how to craft regulations to meet those
goals, conducting an environmental assessment would be useful because the
assessments can focus on preventing transboundary harms. Risk assessments
also need to be scientifically based, which would then incorporate the
183
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opportunity for further scientific research regarding the current health of the
tarpon population while simultaneously providing valuable baseline data.
An accurate environmental assessment also allows all the interested states to
evaluate the status quo as compared to the proposed changes.
However, conducting an environmental assessment in this instance would
be a novel departure from current international norms.
First, this
environmental assessment would have to focus on determining the impact of
potential regulation, rather than the effects of a specific project or
development. Second, this environmental assessment would not necessarily
aim at identifying transboundary harm, because the particular harms have not
occurred. Rather, the assessment would seek to highlight the benefits of
preventing these harms from occurring. The adoption of a new approach to
conducting an environmental assessment is questionable. Yet such use of an
environmental assessment could be analogized to the current use as both are
aimed at prospectively mitigating harms from a currently planned course of
action.
After conducting an environmental assessment to provide scientifically
verifiable data on the greatest impacts to the tarpon fishery, the multi-party,
basin-wide approach would need to address the obstacles of effectively
establishing meaningful regulations.
For instance, there would
understandably be enforcement problems and additional monitoring costs
that could be overly burdensome to some states. However, these costs could
be lessened by further incorporating the current approaches to managing
transboundary rivers.
The United States could lend its scientific expertise to countries with
limited resources in exchange for their monitoring and enforcement of these
provisions. The United States could also provide monetary compensation for
refraining from destroying mangrove habitats. Such additional compensation
would seek to provide incentives for these developing countries to comply
with the basin-wide approach. Furthermore, it makes logical sense for the
United States to exercise its comparative technological advantage in such a
way, as the United States currently has the largest game fishing industry, in
the Gulf of Mexico at least, to protect. Information could then be shared with
stakeholders in order to promote the most scientifically effective
conservation efforts.
Additionally, downstream states could assert the do no harm and timely
notification principles to provide incentives for upstream states to refrain
from moving forward with plans that disrupt the habitat of juvenile tarpon.
By insisting that these principles of customary international law be adhered
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to, downstream states could potentially increase the costs of developing areas
with dense growth of mangroves to the point where upstream states would
not profit from their development.
There are multiple opportunities for states to draw upon the salient
principles of international water law in order to more effectively regulate
migratory species of fish. Both equitable apportionment regimes simply seek
to allocate the benefit of a flowing resource among parties that either directly
access the resource, or collectively share in the benefit. By apportioning the
benefit among these parties in an appropriate manner, states can benefit from
agreeing to sustainably manage the fishery.
V. CONCLUSION
Tarpon are a unique species of fish and as such they pose unique
challenges when faced with the stark realities of conservation efforts. If
tarpon are not properly conserved, it is foreseeable that population levels will
continue to decline, potentially eliminating a $6 billion industry. In order to
prevent catastrophe, a framework based on measures used to apportion
manageable flows of international waterways could be feasibly implemented
to protect their habitat and encourage the use of appropriate tackle when
fishing for tarpon, while also discouraging their commercial or frequent
recreational harvest. Such a measure would safeguard not only a precious
natural resource, but also a burgeoning industry throughout the greater
Caribbean and western Atlantic.

